Anyone wondering about the web’s biggest dangers should check out Carolyn Duffy Marsan’s new article in Network World.

Remember those cyberattacks on Estonia this spring that wiped out government websites and almost brought the country’s banking system to a standstill? That wasn’t even full-fledged cyberwarfare. It was accomplished through ordinary though well-coordinated denial-of-service attacks. (Feeling safe?)

For the U.S., the article points up two lessons. First, as the article notes, U.S. businesses “are better positioned to defend themselves against similar DoS attacks because the United States is so much larger than Estonia and has a more robust network infrastructure.”

True enough. Regardless of the type of attack, network redundancy is crucial to keeping the data flowing. Anything that interferes with network deployment – net neutrality, for example, with its mandated expenses and endless court challenges – will necessarily make our network infrastructure less resistant to attack.

Second, this article illustrates yet again the need for packet management on the network. To be blunt, when DOS, spear phishing or polymorphic virus attacks are unleashed, a bit is definitely not a bit on the network – no matter how frequently or earnestly the net neutrality proponents make that argument.

Anyone buying into the net neutrality notion that “a bit is a bit is a bit” should check out this New York Times article on the dangers of international cyberattacks:

Attacks on the Internet itself, say, through what are known as root-name servers, which play a role in connecting Internet users with Web sites, could cause widespread problems, said Paul Kurtz, the chief operating officer of Safe Harbor, a security consultancy. And having so many nations with a finger on the digital button, of course, raises the prospect of a cyberconflict caused by a misidentified attacker or a simple glitch.

Still not convinced? Read on:

Still, many in the security community and the news media initially treated the digital attacks against Estonia’s computer networks as the coming of a long-anticipated new chapter in the history of conflict — when, in fact, the technologies and techniques used in the attacks were hardly new, nor were they the kind of thing that only a powerful government would have in its digital armamentarium.

This much is clear: Global security risks are rising in tandem with the broadband web. That in turn points to the necessity of deploying networks capable to recognizing threatening data in the form of viruses, Trojan Horses or whatever malware tomorrow’s hackers invent.

Someone once said that a libertarian is a conservative who’s just been arrested. Probably true. But in that same spirit, it will be interesting to hear how the net neutrality crowd describes one of its favorite bogeyman, deep-packet inspection, the next time it helps stop a major denial-of-service attack.

This month’s zombie attack on Estonia’s economy was only the latest example of the growing dangers on the Net. It will assuredly not be the last.

From today’s Washington Post:

“Unfortunately, congressional initiatives aimed at preserving the best of the old Internet threaten to stifle the emergence of the new one.”Network neutrality is supposed to promote continuing Internet innovation by restricting the ability of network owners to give certain traffic priority based on the content or application being carried or on the sender’s willingness to pay. The problem is that these restrictions would prohibit practices that could increase the value of the Internet for customers.”

Few people understand the Internet better than Carnegie Mellon Prof. and “Godfather of the Internet” David Farber. And Michael Katz was Chief Economist at the FCC during the Clinton Administration.

So when these two team up to tell the world that Net neutrality regulations would hurt efforts to curb “viruses, worms, denial-of-service attacks and zombie computers,” prudent lawmakers ought to take notice. The Dynamic Duo point other problems with neutrality regulation:

“When traffic surges beyond the ability of the network to carry it, something is going to be delayed. When choosing what gets delayed, it makes sense to allow a network to favor traffic from, say, a patient’s heart monitor over traffic delivering a music download.”

This op-ed is so good there’s no reason for additional commentary. Check it out.